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ABSTRACT 
Rather than evolving as a platform for renegotiation and debt discharge, as in France, English 
bankruptcy law emerged as a liquidation-only institution after majority arrangements among creditors 
were prohibited, in 1621. However, after 1705, good faith debtors could be offered a discharge, i.e. a 
form of limited liability. Later, private practices also developed into a little-known body of consistent, 
court-enforced, “quasi-bankruptcy rules” based however on voluntary adhesion. A key element was 
the convergence between the old, Law Merchant “composition agreement” and the English trust, to 
which creditors could jointly convey assets. By the 1780s, therefore, merchants were offered rigidity 
under the statutes or large, though voluntary negotiability in their shadow. Conversely, the French 
traders’ courts consistently helped the merchants overcome undue defaults, i.e. market failures. But 
majority vote limited the capacity to restructure rights and to design arrangements that may have better 
preserved their collective interest over time.  
 
Keywords: bankruptcy law, commercial courts, debt renegotiation, Common Law vs. Civil 
Law. 
JEL numbers: N43, K12, K 40 
 
 
 
  
 3 
 
 
 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy is the ultimate market sanction. When markets have failed to impose a change of course 
and when implicit insolvency results in open illiquidity, market exit becomes a systemic necessity. 
And where markets have failed, a public institution should exercise sanction. Ever since the Italian 
Middle-ages, lawmakers have designed the intricate mechanism whereby contractual exchanges are 
suspended, losses shared and assets returned to the market. Hence, not all bankruptcy laws are 
identical. A law that performs reasonably well in one environment can not be expected to deliver the 
same performance elsewhere.  
Still, there is a set of core problems that should be addressed by all bankruptcy laws. They often derive 
from the principle of intercreditor equity, hence from a principle of formal coordination that should be 
substituted to free-wheeling, individual trade-offs. The principle of a pro-rata distribution of losses 
among creditors is the first logical step in this direction, but the most striking feature is arguably a 
decision rule allowing a qualified majority of junior creditors to restructure the property rights of the 
minority. Historically, this has been the main rationale for granting judges a major role in bankruptcy 
proceedings - mere arbiters for instance might not enforce such a rule.  
Once the parties are in court, however, the key question becomes the extent of their bargaining 
capacity. In principle, they are in the best position to balance the respective benefits of either 
liquidation, or restructuring and continuation. If this is true indeed, then it seems that debtors and 
creditors should be supported by the law and the courts, as they try to identify their best way out of 
default. One problem is that a majority rule may not legitimately support any restructuring of property 
rights, especially the most comprehensive ones. A further issue is the risk of adverse externalities, or 
moral hazard: if debtors know ex ante that they may find their way out of a default with reduced cost, 
then failure may become more common and the credit market may shrink. Therefore, lawmakers may 
decide after all that the courts should rather leave the parties to bargain privately and voluntarily—that 
is, out of court though probably not out of law.  
This article compares how, from the 1620s until the 1880s, bankruptcy laws in England and France 
stabilized on opposite equilibria, on two counts. First they did not reach the same balance between 
market discipline and the freedom to recontract, that is between ex ante and ex post concerns. Second 
the division of labour between court proceedings and private voluntary approaches did not work the 
same way. Specifically, bankruptcy law in France has always accepted the judicial confirmation of 
qualified majority votes among creditors, so that courts became the main forum for bargaining on 
debts and assets, with little official interference. Private negotiations by notaries were also widespread, 
but as far as debt renegotiations are concerned, this forum did not emerge as a noticeable source of 
legal evolution. In England, on the other hand, judicial confirmation of votes was forbidden for two 
and half centuries, hence bankruptcy worked exclusively as a debt collection instrument, and a lot of 
business and innovation happened on a private-law basis. Remarkably, by the late eighteenth century, 
a set of parallel though voluntary “quasi-bankruptcy rules” had emerged, that has so far attracted very 
little scholarly attention.  
It is intriguing that the two leading emerging economies of the day made such contrasting and 
enduring choices about a core market institution. In a standard “law and economics” framework, 
market forces would probably have identified much more rapidly a superior solution and induced 
convergence. Alternatively, if the analytical emphasis is placed less on the malleability of institutions 
than on path-dependent patterns, such as “legal origins” for instance, then the challenge becomes to 
account for both the initial divergence and the ultimate convergence of approaches. Since 1843, and 
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more clearly since 1883, English law has indeed allowed for the confirmation of qualified majority 
vote.  
Hence, as it explores these parallel histories, this article contributes to the large body of comparative 
literature that surveys how England and France slowly negotiated their way from the medieval or Law 
Merchant traditions into a modern, pro-market legal order. But this contribution also addresses the 
more theoretical question of how different institutional arrangements might emerge and solve the 
same, well-delineated economic problem. How did the governments commit themselves not to 
confiscate assets and rob creditors? Which alternate fora were made available to the merchants? And 
how did the lawmakers the balance pre-bankruptcy rights and the capacity to design far-reaching, post-
bankruptcy arrangements? Still today, these questions remain at the core of what a contract-based, 
market economy is about and what may be the role for the state and the courts.  
From a methodological viewpoint, this discussion is primarily about the “law in the books”, which is 
surely different from actual practice, although their differences make both approaches important and 
legitimate. However, the sources I draw from go beyond learned treatises and well-known 
commentaries: they include cases and the many practitioners’ law books that have been published 
since the mid-seventeenth century. Specifically these books present many models of agreements, 
deeds, and contracts that offer a remarkable entry into actual commercial practices, as they became 
more formalized and standardized. In other words, I take stock of how the statutes and the legal 
academy framed the issue and I then look at how businessmen and their attorneys addressed urgent 
problems of debt and defaults, collective action and market sanction.  
It should be noted also that issues of economic efficiency are not addressed here: the possibility that 
the legal solutions adopted in England and France respectively may have had a differential economic 
or financial impact is not considered. A second caveat is that the comparison is skewed toward the 
English experience, which is explicitly envisaged as an exception vis-à-vis the French or Continental 
benchmark. Lastly, the reference case here is that of independent businessmen or partners – not 
corporations.  
Section 2 summarizes the relevant economic literature. Section 3 describes how bankruptcy law first 
emerged in Italy and then developed in early-modern France. Section 4 then compares this benchmark 
experience with that of England, from the late sixteenth century till the nineteenth century. Sections 5 
discuss possible explanations for these divergent choices and for their leading to two distinct, 
institutional equilibria. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. MARKET DISCIPLINE AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION 
The expectation that ex post renegotiation may have adverse ex ante effects on implementing contracts 
is widely held in the economic literature. Probably the most general or systematic argument along this 
line derives from the economics of socialist and transition economies and, more specifically, from the 
works of János Kornai (1980). His core concept of soft versus hard budget constraints is based on 
widespread accounts of central planners’ inability to commit themselves not to complete (or refinance) 
investment projects that appear to be bad ones.
1
 Whereas a credible threat of liquidation might have 
induced management to better screen projects and to increase implementation efforts, the lack of ex 
post sanctions led instead to a loose pattern of resource mobilization. By implication, the more general 
lesson of this argument is that any contingent clause that affects the binding power of rules and 
contracts is presumed to have adverse consequences. 
This paradigm thus converges with the “legal origins” literature as initiated by La Porta et al. (1998) 
and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002). In arguing that legal traditions protect contracts differently over time 
and across countries, these authors suggest that the enforcement of budget constraints is indeed the 
causal “transmission channel” from law to development. In particular, the more strongly pro-market 
                                                          
1
 See Kornai (1980). The more recent, standard model was formulated by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). 
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character of English Common law—as compared with Civil or French law—would be reflected (other 
things being equal) by the superior binding power of contractual commitments in the former case. 
Both the “budget constraints” and “legal origins” approaches have a direct effect on how the historical 
account of bankruptcy law is interpreted.
2
 In their review of the literature on soft budget constraints, 
for instance, Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003) claim, without any supportive evidence, that the long-
term trend of market economies has historically been from harder to softer constraints. Although there 
are arguments for the superiority of a relatively tough, pro-creditor approach to bankruptcies in weak 
legal environments (Ayotte and Yun 2008), an alternate hypothesis may also be defended: in a 
monetary systems with no central bank and no lender of last resort, and where secondary markets for 
physical assets are illiquid, a tough bankruptcy law may disproportionately increase the number and 
the cost of undue failures, that in fact reflect market failures.
3
 A narrow entry into the institution and 
low expected return may then lead to widespread creditor passivity and moral hazard (Mitchell 1993, 
Roland 2000).  
Many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century traders’ books actually make the point that an arrangement 
with an insolvent merchant is a viable option if it allows the debtor to liquidate progressively and on 
better terms. But they also note the underlying risks: in the introduction to Le Parfait Négociant 
(1675), Jacques Savary mentions for example that he witnessed failures occurring more than twenty 
years after the decisive losses had been incurred.  
If this risk is assumed and if renegotiation is warranted, the question arises of where and under which 
rules it would take place. A well-established pattern is that settling disputes in court is ex ante the least 
preferable option for merchants – English, French or else. Courts take time and are costly, reputation 
costs are typically high, and all private dealings are revealed to the public eye. Hence, in a typical 
Coasean way, the parties should try to anticipate the outcome of a formal procedure and settle out of 
court, “in the shadow of the law” (Shapiro 1981, Galanter 1981). In the case of bankruptcy, they 
would agree on a distribution of losses that is equivalent to the one they would obtain in court 
(Schwartz 1993, White 1994). Still, the adverse incentives specific to end-game scenarios are 
distinctly pervasive in the case of defaults with multiple creditors. The later may run on the assets, so 
that distributive outcomes would be both unfair and unpredictable; or they may leverage asymmetries 
of information during renegotiation, so that problems of inter-creditor equity may arise. Alternatively, 
the debtor may just run away: in the 1820s English and French debtors were said to pack hotels, in 
Boulogne (France) and Dover (England) respectively.  
These are the main reasons why bankruptcy laws have always been predicated on the notion that, 
unless the freedom of the parties to arbitrate is curtailed, defaults may lead to (largely) sub-optimal 
outcomes (Jackson 1986). Hence, some results that are possible under a bankruptcy statute may be out 
of reach in its absence: bankruptcy is doomed to be altogether a matter of process and substance. The 
problem however is that, at least in the short run, the very fact that the parties may be discretely 
shifted from a market rule of interaction to a constraining, non-market one, may rather add disruption 
or “volatility” in microeconomic interactions.4 In other words, although this institution aims at 
smoothening the consequences of defaults and at extending the capacity of the parties to cooperate, in 
the short-term its non-linear mode of operation may further incite the agents to adopt disruptive 
strategic behaviours.
5
   
                                                          
2
 La Porta et al. (1998), the first article by these authors on the economic effects of “legal origins”, draw on (and 
misinterpret) bankruptcy laws as a source of indices regarding the protection of creditors’ rights. 
3
 Critics of reorganizations who point to their excessive reliance on dubious nonmarket valuations often assume, 
if only implicitly, that agents are not bound by liquidity constraints, as arising from markets; see, for instance, 
Roe (1983) and Baird (1986). 
4
 See for instance the now classic confrontation between, on the one hand, Baird (1987) and Jackson (1982) who 
argue that bankruptcy outcomes should shadow as closely as possible pre-bankruptcy rights, and, on the other 
hand, Warren (1987) who defends that the logic of the process allows for far more discretion.  
5
 By convention, the term bankruptcy refers here to the statutes in the narrow sense, whereas bankruptcy regime 
extends to the broader set of rules, jurisdictions, and established social practices that contribute to the settlement 
of debt defaults in general. 
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The mere fact that for centuries both the statutory and the private routes have always been available 
simultaneously in Europe strongly suggests that their relationship is one of both substitutability and 
complementarity. The consequence is that in the agents’ perspective, the interaction between the 
statutory and the private “work-out” strategies is quite complex. Clearly, for instance, the private route 
should not be analysed in the same terms as the “informal” mechanisms of debt collection that are 
observed in countries with a dysfunctional judiciary.
6
 Nor do they parallel the essentially private or 
professional orders of the type documented by a long line of researchers such as Macaulay (1963), 
Bernstein (1992) or Greif (1993). Even the notion of “arbitration in the shadow of the law”, as applied 
in the case of tort litigation or conflicts over the interpretation of contracts, is inappropriate. The 
reason for this is that bankruptcy settlements are not primarily about legal uncertainty, of the sort that 
may be settled with “small talks” or informal guidance (Ginsburg and McAdams, 2004). Again, they 
are about collective action problems, often of the hard, end-game variety. The following discussion 
analyzes how these alternate options were framed and how they interplayed, in two countries with 
distinct legal traditions.  
 
 
3. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS: THE ITALIAN-FRENCH 
BENCHMARK 
3.1. Italian Origins 
Modern bankruptcy laws emerged in the trading cities of northern Italy (Florence, Pisa, Genoa, 
Venice) during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Kohler 1892, Santarelli 1964). At that time, the 
opening of a bankruptcy procedure already imposed on agents a clearly defined brake on normal 
contractual interactions: the individual remedies of creditors were suspended, and the debtor’s status 
was severely reduced; he could no longer trade; his assets, accounting books, and correspondence 
were seized; he was usually imprisoned and torture was sometimes countenanced. A primary aim of 
these laws was to control the usual endgame problems in strategic interaction: creditors may run on the 
assets and the debtor may fly away, or adopt high-risk strategies of “gambling for resurrection”.  
Creditors could then either liquidate and share the proceeds on a pro-rata basis or negotiate a 
concordato: that is, a collective agreement with the debtor that allowed the latter to recover his assets 
and to resume trading with reduced or rescheduled debts-though without an intact reputation. The 
critical point is that a majority of creditors (generally a qualified majority) could bind dissenters when 
deciding between continuation and liquidation. If needed, a court would confirm the concordato and 
impose enforcement on any holdout investors. The contractual rights of minority creditors were 
thereby intervened, and their remaining wealth invested against their will in new contracts with the 
debtor. The critical character of such decisions was certainly not lost on lawmakers and the involved 
parties, which is no doubt a key reason why these procedures adopted a strong judicial character early 
on.  
These core Italian principles were apparently exported to the rest of Europe, possibly via the great 
fairs, and absorbed into the statutes of the larger trading cities (e.g., Barcelona, Lyons, Antwerp, 
Bruges, Lübeck). As in Italy, procedures were generally conducted by mostly self-regulated, elected 
commercial courts. During the sixteenth century, kings and princes added repressive penal statutes 
against failed debtors.
7
 More comprehensively, starting with the seventeenth century commercial 
customs were progressively confirmed, absorbed, and thoroughly restructured by the legal and judicial 
institutions of the new, large, territorial states (like England and France to start with). Regulations that 
had worked at particular times and places became the founding stones of emerging national 
economies. 
                                                          
6
 In a vast literature, see for instance McMillan and Woodruff (2000) on former Soviet economies, Gambetta 
(1996) on the Italian Mafia  
7
 The first such statutes were enacted in 1543 and 1571 (England) and in 1536 and 1560 (France). 
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This is the moment when the English and French experiences with bankruptcy law diverged. Whereas 
French Commercial law evolved as the legitimate heir to the Italian legacy, English law took a distinct 
trajectory: beginning in 1621, the judicial confirmation of majority arrangements was forbidden and so 
bankruptcy became a single-exit institution that allowed only for liquidation; accords between the 
parties could only be voluntary and private. This apparently minor deviation eventually led to sharply 
contrasting rules of the game, which by the eighteenth century resulted in well-differentiated, rather 
stable bankruptcy regimes. Moreover, this lengthy English exception is not an exclusively bilateral 
pattern: as far as I know, all Continental statutes and codes enshrined the confirmation of majority 
arrangements during the period under review.
8
 This separate English route also had an end: since the 
later part of the nineteenth century, all countries that belong to the Common law tradition have 
allowed for qualified majority votes.  
 
<<<   Table 1  >>> 
 
3.2. French Outcomes: The Law and the Procedures 
An elementary account of the transition in France to an integrated, national legal order starts in the 
seventeenth century with the Kings (i.e. their courts) confirming and enforcing commercial customs.
9
 
Then Colbert, Louis XIV’s reformist Minister of Finance (1661-1683), used these customs as the main 
basis for the 1673 Ordonnance du Commerce. This first modern commercial code, a light text indeed, 
would be compounded until the Revolution by a series of piecemeal royal decisions and by a large 
body of learned comments.
10
 It then left a strong mark on the 1807 Code de Commerce, which would 
also have a large influence across Continental Europe and its colonies.  
In this long-run history, bankruptcy—which was addressed comprehensively in the 1673 statute—is 
probably the item whose evolution since the Italian, medieval experiences presents the clearest 
elements of continuity.
11
 The standard procedure, or faillite, was the direct heir to the Italian fallimento 
and it offered the two usual options.12 If the parties decided to liquidate, however, the debtor would not 
be offered a debt discharge and a fresh start: unless he later fully reimbursed his creditors, he would 
not regain his full civic and professional rights. Alternatively, a continuation arrangement was the 
normal and least dishonorable road to debt restructuring and hence to the discharge of debt. The 
doctrine also made clear that any arrangement would bind only junior creditors - senior creditors were 
fully protected.
13
  
The jurisdictions in charge of bankruptcies were, first, the Cours Consulaires, which the French King 
established in increasing numbers from 1549 onward. Just before the 1673 Ordonnance was adopted, 
                                                          
8
 The Conseillers d’Etat who drafted the 1807 Code de Commerce considered the Concordat to be the 
“crowning” of the procedure (Locré 1829, book 4, p. 150); in his landmark historical treatise, Kohler (1892) 
defined it as “the soul of bankruptcy law” - “die Seele des Konkurswesens” (Kohler 1892, p. 451); . 
9
 See for instance Bounyn (1586), Mareschal (1625) and Le Stile de la Juridiction royale (1657); also Guillon 
(1904).  
10
 Savary’s Parfait Négociant (1675) is by far the most famous commentary; it was re-edited and translated until 
the end of the eighteenth century. Among many others, see also Toubeau (1682), Bornier (1749), and Rogue 
(1773). Laurens (1806) for a last account of bankruptcy law before the 1807 Code.  
11
 The main classical treaties on French bankruptcy law are Renouard (1857), Thaller (1887), Guillon (1904) and 
Percerou (1935); the more recent legal historiography includes Dupouy (1960) and Hilaire (1986).  
12
 Under the Ancien Régime, debtors could also benefit from lettre de répit, which were granted on a 
discretionary basis by the Chancery and gave temporary relief to the debtor. Then was the cession, a Roman 
institution that re-emerged within the Civil (not Commercial) law. Finally, la banqueroute was the penal 
procedure associated with commercial failure in case of fraud. All legal commentators discussed in detail these 
alternative roads. 
13
 Under the Ordonnance, a three-quarters majority (in sums) was needed in order to receive confirmation. The 
term Concordat was rarely used during the Ancien regime and entered the law only in 1807. Before that, terms 
like accord, contrat or composition are often used, as well as attermoiement when only time was offered, 
without debt write-off. 
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they were reformed and streamlined (1668–71) though they did not loose their fairly autonomous, self-
managed character. Traders elected the judges among themselves for two-year terms that ensured a 
continuous turnover among the local commercial elite. Justice was also free of charge, rules of 
discovery and proof were light, attorneys were called in only for larger cases, and an appeal did not 
usually suspend execution.  
Yet, the Juges Consulaires have been constantly in conflict with the standard civil jurisdictions, which 
despised their lack of legal education and their light approach to the rules (and the price) of justice. 
Bankruptcies became a major stake in this competition so that they went to one or the other 
jurisdiction, depending upon time and place. Still, both types of judges applied the Ordonnance, which 
in turn made very clear that the substance of cases should remain squarely in private hands. Judges 
would not weigh on the parties’ decision and cash would never pass through the hands of bailiffs, 
notaries, police officers and “autres personnes publiques” (title 11, article 9). This game continued 
until the Revolution: in 1790, the Cours Consulaires were transformed overnight into the Tribunaux 
de Commerce and, in 1807 the Code de Commerce gave them overall authority over the faillites. Only 
in the smaller towns, where there was no Tribunal de commerce, would the civil courts do the job.
14
  
 
 
4. THE ENGLISH EXCEPTION  
When comparing the Italian-French tradition and the English one, an early significant element is that 
in the latter case the medieval traders’ courts (Pie powders and Stapple courts) were contested early on 
and then sidelined by the Common law courts.
15
 By the sixteenth century, the traders’ courts were 
clearly on their way out at a time when their counterparts were blossoming on the Continent.
16
 Hence, 
absorption of the Law Merchant into the broader legal order would be advanced primarily though very 
progressively by the Common law courts, then by the Equity courts, and finally by a number of 
statutes. But there would be nothing like an Ordonnance, a comprehensive edict, or Code, adopted and 
enforced by the monarch. 
However, in their fight for pre-eminence over commercial affairs, the Common law courts never 
attempted to take control of bankruptcy procedures. They also clearly resisted any intervention in 
private contracts, of which majority votes among creditors is a most striking example. Starting in 
1543, cases were then administrated by so-called Bankruptcy Commissions, created on a case-by-case 
basis by the Chancery after one or more creditors had petitioned the Lord Chancellor. Each 
Commission was a short-lived public authority, whose members were chosen from local notables and 
fellow traders. It received control over a debtor’s assets, and it had the power to put him in prison or 
free him, audit him, control debt titles, collect and sell his assets, and share the resulting dividend. The 
point however is that, contrary to the case of the Cours Consulaires, the judicial character of 
Bankruptcy Commissions was at best partial and their weaknesses regarding procedural guarantees 
were quite clear. At least until the eighteenth century, guidelines for decision making were not 
                                                          
14
 See Kessler (2007) on the 18
th
 century Parisian Cours Consulaire; Hirsch (1991) for a fine monography on 
Lille that extends into 19
th
 century; also a number of contribution published in Les Tribunaux de Commerce 
(2007). 
15
 The literature is far from unanimous in assessing the medieval Law Merchant in England: Holdsworth (1907, 
1925), Gross (1908), Burdick (1909), Hall (1932), and Treiman (1938a) tend to hail it as a self-standing legal 
order, with a specific and enduring influence, whereas the recent literature is far more circumspect; see for 
instance Baker (1979), Rogers (1995), Basile et al. (1998), and Donahue (2004). Note also that in general the 
comparative dimension in this debate is weak. Continental scholars often consider England an economic side-
show until the late 16
th
 century, while their English-language colleagues are very much focussed on the 
relationship between the Law Merchant and the early Common law; by contrast, their referencing the Italian and 
fair court traditions sometimes verge on the impressionistic. See however Galgano’s Lex Mercatoria (constantly 
republished since 1976) or Padoa Schioppa’s many writings on the early history of commercial law. The French-
language literature on the other hand is more limited, although Hilaire (1986) is a fine introduction.  
16
 See among others Holdsworth (1914), Sutherland (1934), Holden (1955), Baker (1979): these authors agree 
that traders’ courts were marginalized early, but they also admit not having a satisfactory explanation of this fact.  
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explicit, Commission member recruitment was not strong, corruption occasioned frequent mention, 
and pressure from the executive bureaucracy was clearly a problem.
 17
 
 
4.1. The Road Towards the Abolishment of Judicial Arrangements  
The consequence of this weak constitution is that Commissions arguably made an unpromising forum 
for a rule-based, judicial approach to the confirmation of majority arrangements. Hence, attempts to 
develop this practice along Continental lines were observed exclusively outside Commissions.
18
 David 
Smith (2010) accounts for this long trial-and-error process, which extended from the 1590s until the 
1620s, whereby Equity courts—in the name of human charity—tried to mitigate the harshness of the 
Common law and impose accommodation on creditors. Under Elizabeth I, petitions by debtors were 
addressed to the Privy Council which typically transferred them to the Court of Request. But this 
practice came under increasing attacks after 1609 and in 1614 the Common Law courts de facto 
obtained the authority to annul, or “prohibit” their Bills of Conformity (as their instruments were 
known). The Chancery then took over but its attempted rescue became also embroiled in the broad 
conflict between the Common law courts and the Parliament on the one hand, and King and Equity 
courts on the other.
19
  
A reformed and streamlined version of the Bills of Conformity was actually introduced in 1620 by 
Francis Bacon—then Lord Chancellor (and hence an ally of the King) and no minor historical figure. 
But this effort was apparently too late: within a year, and in a context of economic crisis,
20
 Bills were 
abolished by the Parliament.
21
 The main figure in this fight was Edward Cooke—then the most 
articulate defender of Common law and Common law courts as well as a major leader in the House of 
Commons. His ultimate attack, on 14 March 1621, was just an opening shot in the final scene of 
Cooke’s long political and personal fight against Bacon. Immediately afterward and in front of the 
same parliamentary committee, charges of corruption were levelled against Bacon, charges to which 
he would confess before being impeached by Parliament on 3 May.
22
 The long-term history of 
economic institutions had just intersected with l’histoire événementielle of great men waging great 
battles. And by the way, note also that Bacon’s private secretary at the time was young Thomas 
Hobbes.  
 
4.2. Bankruptcy as an Absolutist Institution? 
In today’s political vocabulary therefore the confirmation of majority votes in bankruptcy proceedings 
had come to exemplify the much broader attempt to establish an absolutist monarchy endowed with 
new and threatening powers over both the Common law courts and private rights. The “legal origins” 
argument then immediately comes out as the natural contender in providing a broader, consistent 
interpretation of the 1621 bifurcation: the fight against majority vote, at this early hour of economic 
development, may have initiated or crystallized a long-run pattern that gave priority to ex ante market 
discipline and the integrity of contracts over accommodation and judicial interference. Against Gleaser 
                                                          
17
 During the seventeenth century, “Procedures were crudely outlined, clerical requirements were ignored, and 
all the statutes were amorphous on the subject of ultimate administrative and legal responsibility” (Jones 1979). 
On Commissions, see also Holdsworth (1914), Dawson (1950). Price (1694) for a powerful pamphlet against the 
corruption of commissioners; Welbourne (1932) for a colorful description of bankruptcy proceedings in early 
nineteenth-century London. 
18
 It is not clear to what extent the Italian concordato was practiced in England before the late sixteenth-century. 
The main authority supporting this proposition is Malynes, but few other authors concur. 
19
 See Pocock (1987) and Cromartie (2006) for a discussion of the “constitutional debate” over absolutism 
between the Monarchy, the Parliament and the Common lawyers.  
20
 Supple (1959), Kindleberger (1991). 
21
 In 1624 the very attempt to reach an arrangement with adverse effects for creditors would be qualified as a 
penal “act of bankruptcy”, inevitably leading to liquidation 
22
 On the circumstances and the Parliamentary politics of the day, see Zaller (1971), White (1979), Powell 
(1996). 
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and Shleifer (2002), who see the bifurcation between the Common law and Civil law traditions in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, should one rather point to the early seventeenth century?  
The problem with such thesis is not to identify the many occasions when Common law principles and 
Common law courts did bear heavily. Of course, there are a lot of them. The problem is to identify 
permanent formal patterns that would account altogether, and in some pre-ordained way, for the initial 
divergence with the Continental tradition, for the ulterior resilience of the English variant and for its 
specific, pro-market, microeconomic implications. Let’s start with the first issue – divergence.  
What is clear when considering the pre-1621 experience is that the Privy Council, the Court of 
Request, and the Chancery were all willing to pressure recalcitrant minority creditors and even to 
threaten them with imprisonment. Smith (2010) provides a wealth of examples and Treiman (1938a) 
mentions, for instance, how in 1591 the Privy Council instructed the Bankruptcy Commissions to lead 
recalcitrant minority creditors “plainlie to understande that yf anye informacion shalbe broughte at 
anye tyme againste them upon any matter by stricktness of law, they are to looke for noe favor but all 
extreamitie that maie be used, in respecte of the contempte they shewe to her Majestie’s authoritie and 
harde disposicion to theis poor men oppressed by their rigorous dealing”. 
Some thirty years later, Malynes (1622), who supported Continental-style arrangements, shared 
retrospectively this “despotic” view with regard to the Chancery: “the Bills of conformitie were of late 
yeares used in the Chauncerie, which by the Parlement Anno 1621 are made void, because of divers 
great abuses committed in the defence of Bankrupts, who to shelter themselves from the rigor of the 
Common-lawes, did preferre their Bills of complaint in Chauncerie, which was in the statute of 
protection, and the parties broken, became to be releeved for easie composition with their Creditors, 
albeit at charges another way extraordinarie”. 
What such quotations say, is that there were apparently good and practical reasons to limit the Equity 
courts’ discretion on this issue. Hence, attacks by the Common law courts and the Parliament on the 
Bills of Conformity may not be interpreted as reflecting exclusively, or even mainly, an inherent legal 
or ideological bias against majority rule, or as a side argument within an ongoing fight for political 
supremacy. What might have caused the collapse of the Bills is as well the absence of a jurisdiction 
with the legitimacy needed in order to confirm majority votes. In this case, the original factor in the 
English divergence would be primarily located in the marginalization of medieval traders’ courts, in 
the early-modern period: when the demand emerged for a safe procedure of confirmation, no 
jurisdiction could offer the service. Of course, this pragmatic perspective does not exclude that 
ideological factors may have also weighted. But as far as the “legal origin” argument is used in a 
deterministic, a-historical perspective, the burden of the proof is clearly on its side.  
 
4.2. After 1621: The Road To a New Institutional Equilibrium 
The second leg of the legal origins argument would state that after equity principles had been defeated, 
in 1621-24, a super-strong definition of creditors rights would have shaped the long-term evolution of 
the institution in ways permanently favourable to market discipline.  
The initial problem raised by this reading is that during the seventeenth century, the fate of bankrupt 
debtors in England proved quite dire, more so even than under classical debtor Roman law.
23
 If any 
unpaid debt remained after the procedure was closed, then any new resources (e.g., an inheritance) 
acquired or earned by the debtor could be seized. He could also be returned to prison by any creditor 
and would stay there as long as the latter was willing to pay for his incarceration. Business risks were 
further compounded by the Common law’s resistance to partnership’s limited liability of the 
commenda type.
24
 Hence a great number of pamphlets against the “strictness” of debtor law can be 
                                                          
23
 Bankruptcy “has something in it of Barbarity; […] It contrives all the ways possible to drive the Debtor to 
despair, and encourages no new Industry, for it makes him perfectly incapable of anything but starving. This 
Law, especially as it is now frequently executed, tend[s] wholly to the Destruction of the Debtor, and yet very 
little to the Advantage of the Creditor” (Defoe 1697). 
24
 Rogers (1995), Harris (2000); also Getzler and McNair (2005) for a partially revisionist statement. 
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found.
25
 The proposal to once again allow judicial confirmation of majority arrangements actually 
experienced a revival during the last two decades of the seventeenth century. Attempts to reintroduce 
it were made in 1679, in 1693 and in 1696–97, along with ad hoc measures of debt relief (in 1649-
1654, 1670–72, 1678, 1690, and 1694).26   
The breakthrough occurred in 1705 with the Act of Anne, that brought more balance into the 
institution: if the debtor transferred all his assets and acted cooperatively, and if four fifths in sum of 
creditors agreed, then he would be discharged of his residual liabilities and his old debtors could no 
longer throw him in prison or seize his (new) assets. Ironically, the overall intention of lawmakers at 
the time was repressive: as showed by Kaddens (2010), they first introduced death penalty, as a threat 
raised against uncooperative debtors, and they added discharge at a late hour, as a balance. Still, in 
hindsight, the Act of Anne introduced a form of limited liability which main beneficiary was the 
proverbial “honest but unlucky trader” – whether he traded on his own or within a partnership. In later 
decades, and along the usual complaints about costs and corruption, the notion then gained 
prominence that this “fresh start” approach had major social benefits. In the much-quoted commentary 
of Blackstone: “Thus the bankrupt becomes a clear man again; and […] may become a useful member 
of the commonwealth” (1811, p. 488). 27 More generally, and at least since the late eighteenth century, 
the Act of Anne has been consistently hailed as the true birth date of an original, pro-market, liberal 
bankruptcy tradition that uniquely conjoins “principles of humanity and the benefit of trade”—in the 
usual phraseology.
28
 Hence, it seems it was not just by chance that debt discharge survived the 
abolishment in 1818 of its initial counterparty – the threat of death penalty for un-cooperative 
bankrupts, which in practice was very rarely applied.  
Moreover, praising a modern, liberal bankruptcy law came with a remarkable case of amnesia: not 
only was the old conflict over the Bills of Conformity soon forgotten, but the very principle of 
confirmation rarely surfaced again until the 1820s.
29
 Even during later decades, on the long and 
winding road back to the concordat approach, a recognition of employing past or foreign models is 
seldom evident. A first step was an 1825 act that introduced a highly restrictive confirmation 
mechanism that remained virtually unused.
30
 Other failed reforms followed in 1849, 1861, and 1869. 
Lastly, an 1883 act offered a two-way approach: agents could choose either a Continental-style 
renegotiation or a voluntary private composition with more limited rules of publicity and registration. 
Interestingly small firms opted rather for the continental option, while the traditional, English one 
remained favoured by the largest businesses.
31
 Still today, its heir-apparent remains widely practiced 
                                                          
25
 The digital collection “Early English Books Online” that covers the seventeenth centuries includes (a 
minimum of) 52 pamphlets, petitions or libels against prison for debt, about half of them dated between 1640 
and 1653. Note however that prison for debt concerned bankrupts as well as small debtors who had no access to 
it. 
26
 See Treiman (1938a) and Hoppit (1987). The 1697 act, which abolished the 1696 act on arrangement, 
mentions primarily the opportunities for fraud and deception. However, Cooper (1801) states that only a single 
arrangement was actually confirmed during the whole year when the law was in effect. 
27
 In 1732 a comprehensive “codifying Act” reiterated the principle of discharge and would remain, more 
generally, the touchstone of legislation until 1825. Hoppit (1987) discusses how bankruptcy proceedings worked 
during the eighteenth century (chapter 3), and how they related to the rules applying to small debts and to 
Insolvency proceedings; see also his quarterly statistical series, and Marriner (1980).  
28
 Terms similar to these are used by Cooke (1799), Cullen (1800), and Beawes (1813). See also in the modern 
literature Tabb (1991) and McCoid (1996). 
29
 In his treatise on Commercial law, Wyndham Beawes (1813) allocates more than a hundred pages to 
bankruptcy issues—including a rather detailed comment on the 1673 French Ordonnance—without once 
mentioning the concordat. In the case of the Netherlands, Beawes suggests that traders “may find some method 
to settle with the creditors”. Cooper (1801) defines the French concordat as “a mode of composition which not 
unfrequently takes place”. 
30
 On the 1825 law, see Holt (1827). More generally, on bankruptcy law and practice during the nineteenth 
century, Duffy (1985) and Lester (1995). 
31
 “[T]he great commercial world, alienated and scared by the divergence of the English bankruptcy law from 
their own habits and notions of right and wrong, avoided the court of bankruptcy as they would the plague. The 
important insolvencies which had been brought about by pure mercantile misfortune were administered to a large 
extent under private deeds and voluntary compositions, which, since they might be disturbed by the caprice or 
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and actively defended as the “London approach” to business failures (Brierley and Vlieghe 1999, 
Armour and Deakin 2000, Willman 2008). 
For one thing, therefore, what the overall, long-term history tells is the difficulty of restating it as the 
development of some permanent, core principles that would have guided in a predictable manner 
successive generations of lawmakers. First, after Bills of Conformity were abolished, neither the 
Common law courts nor the Parliament proposed an alternate framework that could be considered 
anything like pro-market or pro-enterprise. Then, when discharge was eventually adopted in 1705, the 
Parliament actually introduced majority vote and so the contractual rights of minority creditors could 
now be intervened. Over the course of the nineteenth century, lawmakers would fight to further extend 
this rule and ease the way for the confirmation of arrangements. In 1849 they would even allow the 
judges to discharge debt against the will of creditors.  
More generally, successive generations of English lawmakers would first trumpet the virtue of hard 
budget constraints and then hail the modernity of offering a fresh start. They would classify any 
attempt to negotiate an arrangement as a quasi-penal Act of Bankruptcy but later would develop a 
remarkably open, free-wheeling bankruptcy regime. Many would also hail the integrity of contracts as 
the ultimate foundation of civil society and public order,
32
 while others argued for generations against 
the huge arbitrary costs imposed by society on so many;
33
 the latter may also have underlined that the 
never-ending English debate on prison for debt and the recurring royal amnesties attest to a rather 
weak “transmission channel” from threat to discipline.  
Of course there is nothing wrong or unique about this. Policy debates are made of dilemma like this, 
whether arguments are exchanged in courts, in Parliament or in the broader public. Coming to terms 
with an open, competitive market economy is a never-ending experience and, surely, there is no reason 
why this would be different for bankruptcy. Economic cycles, a changing institutional and political 
environment, evolving cultural perceptions may push the balance very differently, though within a 
given inherited legal vocabulary.  
 
 
5. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINUING DIVERGENCE: A STRUCTURAL THESIS 
The previous section argued that the specific judicial and legal history of England, during the early-
modern ages, bore heavily on the exceptional course taken by its bankruptcy law after the 1620s. The 
point however is that holding on to this original mark is just not enough when trying to account for the 
ulterior development of this institution, as for the long-term stability of the Anglo-French contrast. In 
other, more epistemological words: there is no apriori reason why permanence over time of a given 
pattern, or institutional equilibrium, should respond to the same causes as the original bifurcation. 
Whereas origination may result from an idiosyncratic addition of elementary factors, resilience calls 
for a structural or synchronic perspective: one that emphasizes how a series of successive, mutually 
reinforcing adjustments came to shape expectations and behaviours, and then deliver reasonably 
functional economics outcomes that would warrant policy support and incremental reforms, rather 
than abolition.  
In the bankruptcy literature, some of these structural traits have been studied as self-standing issues, 
but bringing them together allows for a more consistent understanding of how they interrelated (see 
table 1).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
malice of a single outstanding creditor, were always liable to be made the instruments of extortion” (Bowen 
1907). 
32
 “[F]idelity in performance of Covenants and Promises is one main foundation of a well ordered 
Commonwealth. […] If Bankrupts the Arch-builders of fraud, utterly subvert and take this away, as indeed they 
do, who doubteth but that the Commonwealth, unlesse prevention be in time used, will shortly be ruinated? […] 
If the Bankrupts weaken and violate performance of fidelity […] the Commonwealth cannot florish, but become 
a body without a Soule” (Sauterius 1640, p. 22). 
33
 On prison for debt, see in a vast literature Innes (1980), Lester (1995), and Finn (2003). 
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6.1. Rules of the Judicial Game 
Since the 16
th
 century, initiation of a bankruptcy was associated in England with the observation of a 
so-called Act of Bankruptcy, originally a reprehensible one that allowed one or more creditors to 
petition for a Commission (Treiman, 1938b). As a consequence, entry into bankruptcy was only 
“involuntary”—that is, initiated by creditors. Before 1705, the threat of lifelong prison rendered moot 
the alternate, “voluntary” road (initiated by the debtor); later, the possibility of discharge added new 
reasons for leaving control over entry firmly in the hands of creditors. If the procedure were instead 
framed as a platform for negotiation, as in France, then there would be no reason to restrict entry into 
bankruptcy: mutual control would take place inside, provided the institution’s internal architecture was 
adequate and the incentives to initiate the procedure were also adequate (Baird 1991). Indeed, there is 
just no debate in France on the voluntary versus involuntary issue, which is much discussed in the 
Anglo-American historical literature.
34
 By the same token, the opposition between pro-debtor and pro-
creditor statutes is also very much an Anglo-American concern. Open-ended negotiation tends to place 
the focus on intercreditor relationships and hence on the balance between pro-liquidation and pro-
continuation interests, or between senior and junior interests.  
Instead of an observable Act of Bankruptcy, French law envisaged the opening of a procedure as a 
response to a firm’s underlying economic “state” and where it might fall. « Un commerçant est en 
faillite, ou tombe en faillite », as the contemporary language still has it. Of course, insolvency was the 
underlying issue at stake, whatever its definition at the time, and major difficulties were encountered 
when attempting to recognize this unenviable state. Judges were certainly looking for directly 
observable (though often elusive) signs or even for acts. 
However, the notion of an état de faillite also invites an inquiry into the reason for the failure and the 
prospects for recovery. Its sheer ambiguity makes explicit the need to address an in-built informational 
problem. And if private transactions should be supported, then all available information should indeed 
be collected, centralized, and shared among all parties. Accounting books and correspondence should 
be open, the debtor interrogated, the cause of his failure queried, and experts possibly consulted; all 
this was made clear either by commercial customs or the 1673 Ordonnance, the first statute to allow 
the opening of a merchant’s accounting books against his will. In the English framework, there was 
certainly a need to identify all assets and to check, for instance, that false creditors did not join in the 
distribution of dividends; successive statutes included increasing regulation on this score. But because 
the fate of the business was sealed once a Commission had been created, exploring the reasons for 
failure and the prospects for recovery was an issue of only secondary importance. An institution that 
was based entirely on ex ante market incentives faced far fewer requirements in terms of ex post 
discovery and internal governance, and for the simple reason that there was so little room for 
deliberation and choice. 
A corollary is that disentangling the penal and civil dimensions built into the procedure proved to be 
much more difficult in England. Initially, defining the bankrupt as a criminal was the only way to take 
control of his assets so as to distribute the proceeds.
35
 But because there was no way for the debtor to 
negotiate an arrangement and regain the management of his assets, no internal logic urged a distinction 
between those who could trade again and those who should not; an ex post decision, as the one 
allowed after 1705, would do as well. In the French case, the very possibility of continuation made it 
necessary to differentiate between the intrinsic (commercial and financial) state of the firm and the 
personal behavior of the businessman, who might have acted in a reprehensible manner. Well before 
the 1673 Ordonnance, la faillite was explicitly designed as a civil or commercial framework for 
renegotiation with no intrinsic penal dimension, whereas la banqueroute involved crime and 
                                                          
34
 “One of the most fascinating tales in the development of bankruptcy jurisprudence concerns the monumental 
transformation by which the inthinkable—voluntary bankruptcy—became commonplace” (Baird 1991, p. 142). 
See also McCoid (1987, 1988). 
35
 Treiman (1938b). This problem is linked to the large role given under Common law to personal arrest, which 
was an alternative (not a complement) to seizure of assets. See Levy (1968) and Cohen (1982). 
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prosecution.
36
 This affected the overall logic of proceedings but also the way bankruptcy law was 
articulated to the main bodies of law – civil and commercial, penal, constitutional, procedural.  
This account contradicts the common narrative by which the introduction of debt discharge in 1705 
would have given English (and American) bankruptcy law an early and uniquely modern pro-market 
pattern.
37
 Continental lawmakers had actually noted for centuries that keeping debtors in jail 
indefinitely and pre-empting all future income flows was not a promising incentive scheme.
38
 The 
point is that, under Italian and French statutes, discharge would be decided solely by the creditors and 
generally as part of a broader settlement; the notion that judges may discharge debt unilaterally, as in 
England after 1849, is completely alien to the Civil law tradition.  
 
<<    TABLE  2  >> 
 
 
6.2. Private Ordering: the Law Merchant meets English Trusts 
If we now take a step back and look at how the overall bankruptcy regimes operated, a final element to 
take into account is the manner in which debtors and creditors settled out of court when they wanted to 
avoid the costs and constraints of a formal process. Remarkably, economic and legal historians have 
had little to say on this topic beyond casual references to “private arrangements” and 
“compositions”.39 This dearth is especially striking in the case of England, where these accords 
became widely used and were consistently enforced by the courts. And rather than deriving from 
statutes, these rules emerged from the practice of businessmen and were progressively confirmed.  
A first period of innovation extends from the later decades of the seventeenth century up to the 1720s. 
It witnessed the slow convergence of two institutions of very different origins. On the one hand were 
the traditional composition agreements resembling those used on the Continent and whose roots were 
in the old Law Merchant.
40
 In short, provided they all agreed, creditors could at their discretion offer to 
the debtor either more time or a write-off in addition to a safe conduct, that would suspend the threat 
                                                          
36
 This differentiation was already accepted by the late medieval Italian jurisconsults, like Straccha. It was then 
written into the French Code Michaud (1629): although this code was never enacted, the jurisprudence was 
comforted. From Mareschal (1625), to Savary (1675), Toubeau (1682), Denisart (1771) and down to Laurens 
(1806) all treatises and commentaries essentially start by re-stating the difference between faillite and 
banqueroute, almost as a matter of terminology. How the dividing line was drawn in practice is however a much 
more confused matter. Rules of coordination between jurisdictions are anything but clear, at least under the 
Ancien Regime; and the commentators fluctuate widely between an interpretation of la faillite as being caused 
exclusively by exogenous forces or possibly also by the intentional acts of the debtor. In his quasi-official 
commentary of the 1807 Code, Locré, from the Conseil d’Etat, first speaks of “pures faillites” that are caused by 
“une force majeure et invincible”, but he then proceeds by defending that a well-designed statute may incite 
traders not to take excessive risks. Further reading suggests that, at least discursively, the gap between the 
unwise and the illegal was filled by that remarkable matter: dishonour. (Locré, 1829, Book 3, page 461).  
37
 “The idea that bankruptcy should be utilized to overcome the results of some financial misfortune, and that it 
should be possible for an individual (…) to obtain a discharge, is English in origin and essentially English in its 
main characteristics.” (Burgin 1923) 
38
 In Les Coutumes du Beauvaisis (1283), one of the best-known medieval legal treatises, Philippe de 
Beaumanoir had already made the point: « Ce serait contraire cose à l’humanité qu’on laissât toujours corps 
d’homme en prison pour dette, puisqu’on voit que le créancier ne peut être payé par la prison » (quoted in 
Troplong 1847, p. 19). Or : « it would be contrary to humanity to leave a man lying in prison for his debts, since 
we see that the creditor will not be paid by the prison”.  
39
 Muldrew (1998) presents detailed analysis of the interaction between credit markets and court in the early-
modern period, including bankruptcy. Hoppit (1987) comments on compositions during the eighteenth century 
and mentions trusts. On the nineteenth century experience, Lester (1995) offers statistical indications that 
compositions were actually far more numerous than bankruptcies.  But none of these authors explore in detail 
how compositions worked and evolved, and how they addressed the underlying collective action problems.  
40
 See Malynes (1622), Hutton (1652), Billinghurst (1674), and Brown (1701). For Continental versions, see 
Savary (1675), or Peri (1672). 
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of imprisonment for a given period. Such an offer was often balanced by a number of conditions in 
terms of accountability and surveillance; as a variant, a Letter of Inspectorship or Letter of 
Administration involved only supervision and no financial concession. Until the mid-nineteenth 
century, a great number of law treatises and traders’ textbooks offered highly standardized models of 
such letters, which in fact changed little over time.  
Contrary to the composition, the second institution at stake, the trust, is typically English. Because it 
initially belonged to land and inheritance law, it existed in a world far apart—socially, politically, and 
legally—from commerce.41 The issue at stake therefore is how trusts would progressively be made 
available to traders as an instrument to renegotiate debts and manage commercial assets on a collective 
basis. By the 1670s it was common for a landowner to assign his properties to the benefit of inheritors 
and creditors, possibly with the addition of a debt write-off (Godolphin 1674, Bridgeman 1682). After 
the landowner’s death, the trustee would pay off the debts first, perhaps in order of their legal ranking, 
and then transfer the balance (or revenue flow) to the landowner’s heirs. In Arcana Clericalia George 
Billinghurst (1674) confirms the point as regard the case of unmovable assets, which in practice means 
land. But remarkably he does not mention it in the second half of his book, which deals exclusively 
with traders’ interests (e.g., partnership, maritime contracts, bills, etc.). Only traditional or Continental 
compositions are envisaged, structured by bond contracts between the debtor and each individual 
creditor.  
Twenty years later, however, in The law against the bankrupts (1695) Goodinge mentions that 
Commissioners might assign the debtor’s estate in trust to the creditors. In other words, and under the 
specific conditions of a bankruptcy, trusts could now become a vehicle for the collective interests of 
commercial creditors, thereby allowing for instance for a gradual liquidation. Finally, Bird in The 
Practicing Scrivener and Modern Conveyancer (1729) presents a model for the “Absolute assignment 
of debts to a Person, in Trust, for himself and the rest of the Creditors” (p. 389); thus a trust could now 
be created for the sake of the parties’ collective interest even outside bankruptcy, though apparently 
with the view to manage only debt titles. The fact that Bird’s was a practitioner’s book that includes 
many models of other agreements or contracts, on a wealth of different subjects, clearly indicates that 
this practice was accepted and could have become somewhat standardized. Separately, Bird also states 
that after the opening of a bankruptcy procedure, if all creditors and the debtor agreed privately on a 
composition, then they might ask for the proceedings to be closed or “superseded”. In other words, 
bankruptcy was not anymore a strict “one entry-one exit” process. If the parties solved their collective 
action problems, they could close the judicial proceeding. Bargaining in the shadow of the law had 
become a more sophisticated game: it could continue in parallel with a bankruptcy proceeding.  
By the 1720s it then seems that the main pieces of the puzzle were in place: bankruptcy, composition, 
trust—and discharge (the Act of Anne). Innovation then seems to have stalled, a point noticed later by 
Holland (1864). Or perhaps lawyers just kept writing along the usual dividing lines of the legal 
academy, without exploring further the new connections invented by practitioners.
42
 What is sure, 
however, is that by the late eighteenth century compositions-cum-trusts were widely practiced and 
enjoyed strong court protection. Cases are commented and comprehensive models of such accords are 
published i.a. in Barton’s Original Precedents in Conveyancing (1802) and in Montefiore’s 
Commercial and Notarial Precedents (1803). The dates of these publications suggest that the 
economic and financial disruptions brought about by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars might 
have accelerated legal innovations in England. Then, Crabb’s 1835 Conveyancer’s Assistant offers 
two remarkable examples of a complex management contract built into a trust deed, established to the 
                                                          
41
 Trusts were initially assignments made by a landowner to (what we today would call) a fiduciary agent who 
would exercise the property rights in favor of a third-party—typically, in the early centuries, a widow or other 
inheritor(s). See Langbein (1995), Macnair (1998), Baker (2007, chapters 15–17). Also the classical 1904 essays 
reproduced in Maitland (2003).  
42
 John (1735) includes materials comparable to those present in Bird (1729); but for instance the connection 
between bankruptcies on the one hand, and trust and conveyances on the other, is absent from both Green (1776) 
and Sanders (1792), which are among the main, late eighteenth treatises on the respective subjects. 
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benefit of creditors though in the absence of any formal bankruptcy proceeding.
43
 Trusts in other 
words had now become a vehicle for extended industrial and financial renegotiations.  
This evolutionary process based on private law is indeed similar to the one analysed by Getzler and 
McNair (2005) in the case of limited liability or, more closely, by Harris (2000) in the case of un-
incorporated joint-stock companies. There are good reasons indeed to believe that in practice there 
were linkages between this later experience and the one being discussed here.  
 
6.3. Private Ordering, early 19° century: a quasi-bankruptcy rule 
How did these private-law, non-statutory arrangements work? Which rules allowed the parties to 
circumvent part at least some of the collective action problems caused by the absence of a majority 
rule ?  
According to the various cases and commentaries published from the 1780s onwards, the first 
evidence is that the defining constraint around which the entire legal construction revolved was still 
the 1621 prohibition of Bills of Conformity. Indeed, anything looking like a side-agreement, or an 
attempt to arm-twist recalcitrant creditors, could warrant the immediate opening of a bankruptcy 
proceeding. Thus, on the one hand, the constant reminders not to cross the sometimes indistinct “red 
line” and, on the other, the recurring account of: “the extreme difficulty of getting all creditors, where 
the number of them is great, to aquiesce in the arrangement”.44  
That being said, the jurisprudence clearly aimed at limiting as far as possible the room for disruptive 
or opportunistic behaviours. For instance, whereas a rigid interpretation of compositions would have 
required express written adhesion before a deed (i.e., the final legal instrument) became binding, it was 
decided that even an oral agreement made at the creditors’ meeting would be sufficient, provided other 
parties had acted in reliance of that signal: “if a creditor, by his undertaking to accept a composition, 
induce the debtor to part with his property to his creditors, or induce the other creditors to discharge 
the debtor, to enter into the composition deed, or deliver up securities to him, such creditors would be 
bound by such undertaking”.45 In fact the jurisprudence construed compositions as a collective 
contract that created a legal irreversibility and substituted its own collective rules to the default, i.e. 
contractual rules – just like bankruptcy. This was very neatly stated: “all the creditors being assembled 
for the purpose of arranging the defendant’s affairs, they all undertook and mutually contracted, with 
each other”.46 Or, in another formulation : “upon a composition deed all the parties are supposed to 
stand in the same situation (…) and no engagement can stand which has been held from the whole 
body of the creditors (…). In bankruptcy there is no concert or understanding between the 
creditors”.47  
 
On that basis, a series of specific rules were added, which indeed shadow a fair part of how a generic 
bankruptcy rule is structured:  
- Once creditors had joined a composition agreement, they could no longer rely on individual 
remedies, so that the risk of a run on either the assets or the courts was de facto stayed;  
- Debts not yet mature were accelerated; that is, they were considered as if they had come due, so that 
they were all brought together on the table “as if the same debts had been proved or claimed under 
a fiat of bankruptcy”.48 At this point, the parties could also rely upon one of the Masters of the High 
                                                          
43
 The first ever treaty on compositions is Montagu (1824), but he does not say much on trusts; afterwards, the 
main authors are Forsyth (1841), Holland (1864) and Brown (1868).  
44
  Forsyth (1841), p.16 
45
 Crabb (1835, p. 308). Cases establishing this rule include Ex Parte Sadler (1808), Bradley v. Gregory (1810), 
Butler v. Rhode (1820). 
46
 Chitty (1824), quoting an unreferenced case. 
47
 Britten v. Hughes (1829) 
48
 Crabb (1835, p. 308). 
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Court of Chancery in order to establish the validity of both the debtor’s accounts and the creditors’ 
debt titles. Thus a public authority would directly support private coordination.  
- Creditors would be paid on an equal (pro-rata) basis and any secret side-arrangement between the 
debtor and some creditors would be void.
49
 In other words a principle of intercreditor equity was 
built into the institution, along the lines followed since the Middle-Ages by Continental bankruptcy 
laws.  
- Collectively agreed side-arrangements, however, were possible so that small or minority creditors 
could be bought-out by the majority, or by the main players. This reduced the risk of holdout.  
- If a bankruptcy were declared on the back of a composition, then creditors would retain whatever 
payment they had received in the composition while participating in the eventual liquidation on the 
basis of the initial debt.
50
 The imposition of an obligation to reimburse the first payments, or to 
participate in the bankruptcy only on the basis of reduced debts, would have created strong ex ante 
disincentives to participate in private compositions.  
- Lastly, and even most significantly, majority rule apparently applied among the parties once they 
had joined a composition; in other words, the “sanctity” of the initial debt contracts warranted a 
unanimity-based decision rule only once – when entering collective action – but not afterwards.51 
From a jurisprudential point of view, the commitment entered into with the other creditors was 
sufficiently strong to first displace these earlier contracts and then enforce a majority rule among 
the parties that would extend in the future, well after they had left the negotiating table. The parties 
were considered to have joined a perpetual collective body (the trust), not solely a platform for 
contractual renegotiation (the court). On the other hand, the rights of senior creditors remained 
intact
52
.  
 
The legal and economic consistency of this progressive build-up of precedents is impressive, but there 
were also problems that limited public support. The old unanimity rule caused continuing frustration 
and judicial safeguards were obviously a source of concern, whether one thinks to asymmetric access 
to information, publicity, or to power relationships during the negotiation. Harris (2000) also 
underlines that before the 1870s trusts were not perfect business vehicles: they raised problems of 
unlimited responsibility for the trustees, internal governance problems could be substantial, etc. Indeed 
a Parliamentary report on bankruptcy reform already stated in 1840 that “the only alteration in the law 
relating to arrangement with creditors through the medium of such [trust-]deed, which we think it 
right, at present, to recommend to your Majesty is, that they should be placed under more efficient 
control”. 53 
So what happened in France with regard to the private side of debt restructurings? Were comparable 
developments observed in an environment where collective action within bankruptcy was strongly 
supported by the law and the courts? The answer is simple though not straightforward. On the one 
hand, by all accounts there were many private arrangements made and kept by notaries. On the other 
hand, the structure of these voluntary accords show remarkably little change over the entire period: the 
parties freely negotiated about delays, write-offs or a variety of profit-sharing schemes; yet each 
collective agreement would then be executed via an exchange of new bilateral debt contracts between 
the debtor and each individual creditor. In other words, French bankruptcy law probably offered a 
                                                          
49
 Cockshott v. Benett (1788), Mawson v. Stock (1801); by the same token, if assets were discovered or inherited 
after a debt-write had been agreed under a composition, then creditors could not sue on their initial contracts 
(Lord Castleton v. Lord Fanshaw, 1699) 
50
 Ex parte Vere (1812). 
51
 Cork v Saunders (1817), see also the model agreement by Crabb (1835, p. 309). Interrestingly, this rule is the 
same as the one so strikingly formulated by Rousseau in Le Contrat Social (1762): « La loi de la pluralité des 
suffrages est elle-même un établissement de convention, et suppose au moins une fois l’unanimité » (book I, 
chapter 5). Or: the law of majority vote is a convention that, at least once, requires unanimity.  
52
 Stock vs. Mason (1798). 
53
 Report of the Commissioners (1840), p. xii; quoted in Forsyth (1841). 
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fairly efficient and well-protected platform for collective recontracting; but collective action was 
confined to the court’s premises.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
English bankruptcy law did not evolve gradually out of the Italian medieval legacy, as did the French 
law. After the 1621 prohibition against majority rule among creditors it remained a rather repressive, 
anti-market institution until two additions to the law brought about a more supportive institutional 
equilibrium. First, after 1705 good faith debtors were offered the possibility of a debt discharge, i.e. a 
form of limited liability. Second, private law practices progressively developed into a consistent body 
of court-enforced rules that supported negotiation among the parties, though on a voluntary, i.e. 
unanimity basis. Critically, this evolution rested on the slow convergence between the old, Law 
Merchant “composition agreement” and the trust: a perpetual civil body that offered both flexibility 
and legal protection, and to which the parties could convey assets so as to manage them as a going 
concern.  
The elegance of the eventual outcome is that two distinct policy aims – ex ante market discipline and 
ex post recontracting – were addressed by two distinct institutions: bankruptcy and private 
arrangements. Still, this left the merchants with no ready instrument to address defaults caused by 
market failures: the failure of creditors to agree collectively, or plain creditor passivity, might have 
caused undue or sub-efficient liquidations. In France the overall pattern was the reverse one: traders’ 
courts offered flexibility and legal protection while rigidity prevailed outside courts. The overall 
regime made it comparatively easier for them to respond to liquidity shocks, or to adjust to illiquid 
secondary markets for capital goods. But it presented two drawbacks: the risk of moral hazard, and the 
difficulty to bargain on more substantial debts and assets restructurings. Indeed, there were few 
permanent vehicles for the collective interests of the parties, a constraint that probably increased over 
time as businesses became more capital-intensive. Maitland actually noted in Moral Personality and 
Legal Personality (1904) that the long-standing resistance of French law to perpetual civil 
organizations did not extend to businesses. In fact, this bias resurfaces in the case of their failure.  
Here however is the point of convergence between these two experiences. In both traditions, 
bankruptcy remained structured, though in different ways, by the unique strength that derives from 
free, individual commitments. The point is that the narrow entry, voluntary character of the English 
composition-cum-trust supported a renegotiation of initial contracts that could be far more 
comprehensive than under the open access, majority rule that governed the French Concordat. 
Individual adhesion, provided it was obtained, warranted in England a degree of irreversibility in the 
restructuring of property rights which a mere adjudication in France would not support.  
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TABLE 1 - Medieval and Early-modern statutes sanctioning majority vote within bankruptcy 
 
  
Italy Bologna (1509), Florence (1322, 1415, 1585), Siena (1619), Venice 
(1395), Genoa (1589) 
Flanders (Antwerp) Statute (1615) 
Republic of Geneva Statuts de la République de Genève (1713) 
Hamburg Statute on bankruptcy (1753) 
Nuremberg Statutes (1517, 1634) 
Prussia Code Prussien (?) 
Austria  Statute 1734, 1781 
Spain Ordenanzas of Bilbao (1737) 
Low Countries Amsterdam 1659 statute (Kamer van der Desolate Boedels) 
France  Bounyn (1586), Mareschal (1625), Le stile de la jurisdiction royale 
établie dans la ville de Lyon (1657), Ordonnance sur le commerce 
(1673) 
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TABLE 2 - English and French early modern bankruptcy law: A summary comparison 
 
 England, 1625–1880s France 
Bankruptcy Statutes 
Possible outcomes  Liquidation only Liquidation or renegotiation 
Institutional structure Administrative Judicial 
Signal/criteria Acts of bankruptcy État de faillite 
Initiation Involuntary only Involuntary and voluntary 
Role for discovery Limited Important 
Qualified majority vote Impossible, then limited Standard 
Debt discharge and fresh start  After 1705 Always there 
Distinction between penal and 
civil dimensions 
Late and difficult Intrinsic 
Main expected benefit of the law Ex ante market discipline Ex post absorption of exogenous 
shocks 
Main downside risk of the law Undue liquidations Moral hazard 
Out-of-Courts Arrangements 
Private agreements  Most common Most common 
Capacity to design permanent, 
post-negotiation, collective 
arrangements 
Large  
(from late 18
th
 c. onwards) 
Inexistent 
Willingness of the courts to 
sanction private innovation 
Substantial Limited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
